Proclus Theology of Plato Intelligible Gods
T H E I N T E L L I G I B L E G O D S
Let The One be honoured by us in silence, and prior to silence by union
Again therefore, the mystic doctrine concerning The One must be resumed by us, in order that proceeding from the first principle, we may celebrate the second and third principles of the whole of things.
Of all beings therefore, and of the Gods that produce beings, one exempt and imparticipable cause pre-exists, - a cause ineffable indeed by all language, and unknown by all knowledge and incomprehensible, unfolding all things into light from itself, subsisting ineffably prior to, and converting all things to itself, but existing as the best end of all things.
This cause therefore, which is truly exempt from all causes, and which gives subsistence unically to all the unities of divine natures, and to all the genera of beings, and their progressions, Socrates in the Republic calls The Good, and through its analogy to the sun reveals its admirable and unknown transcendency with respect to all intelligibles.
But again, Parmenides denominates it The One. And through negations demonstrates the exempt and ineffable hyparxis of this one which is the cause of the whole of things. But the discourse in the epistle to Dionysius proceeding through enigmas, celebrates it as that about which all things subsist, and as the cause of all beautiful things. In the Philebus however, Socrates celebrates it as that which gives subsistence to the whole of things, because it is the cause of all deity. For all the Gods derive their existence as Gods from the first God.
Whether therefore, it be lawful to denominate it the fountain of deity, or the kingdom of beings, or the unity of all unities, or the goodness which is generative of truth, or an hyparxis exempt from all these things, and beyond all causes, both the paternal and the generative, let it be honoured by us in silence, and prior to silence by union, and of the mystic end may it impart by illumination a portion adapted to our souls.
There are two principles after The One: bound and infinity
But let us survey with intellect the biformed principles proceeding from and posterior to it. For what else is it necessary to arrange after the union of the whole theory, than the duad of principles? What the two principles therefore are of the divine orders after the first principle, we shall in the next place survey.
For conformably to the theology of our ancestors, Plato also establishes two principles after The One. In the Philebus therefore, Socrates says, that God gives subsistence to bound and infinity, and through these mingling all beings, has produced them, the nature of beings, according to Philolaus subsisting from the connexion of things bounded, and things infinite.
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If, therefore, all beings subsist from these, it is evident that they themselves have a subsistence prior to beings. And if secondary natures participate of these mingled together, these will subsist unmingled prior to the whole of things. For the progression of the divine orders originates, not from things co-ordinated and which exist in others, but from things exempt, and which are established in themselves.
As therefore The One is prior to things united, and as that which is passive to The One, has a second order after the imparticipable union, thus also the two principles of beings, prior to the participation of and commixture with beings, are themselves by themselves the causes of the whole of things. For it is necessary that bound should be prior to things bounded, and infinity prior to infinites, according to the similitude to The One of things which proceed from it. For again, if we should produce beings immediately after The One, we shall no where find the peculiarity of The One subsisting purely. For neither is being the same with The One, but it participates of The One, nor in reality is that which is the first The One; for, as has been frequently said, it is better than The One.
Where therefore is that which is most properly and entirely one?
Hence there is a certain one prior to being, which gives subsistence to being, and is primarily the cause of it; since that which is prior to it is beyond union, and is a cause without habitude with respect to all things, and imparticipable, being exempt from all things. If however this one is the cause of being, and constitutes it, there will be a power in it generative of being. For every thing which produces, produces according to its own power, which is allotted a subsistence between that which produces and the things produced, and is of the one the progression and as it were extension, but of the other is the pre-arranged generative cause.
For being which is produced from these, and which is not The One Itself, but uniform, possesses its progression indeed from The One, through the power which produces and unfolds it into light from The One; but its occult union from the hyparxis of The One. This one therefore which subsists prior to power, and first pre-subsists from the imparticipable and unknown cause of the whole of things, Socrates in the Philebus calls bound, but he denominates the power of it which is generative of being, infinity. But he thus speaks in that dialogue, "God we said has exhibited the bound, and also the infinite of beings. "
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| is the one which subsists prior to power, and first pre-subsists from the imparticipable and unknown cause of the whole of things | is the one which is generative of being |
All beings are from bound and infinity
The first therefore and unical God, is without any addition denominated by him God; because each of the second Gods is participated by being, and has being suspended from its nature. But the first indeed, as being exempt from the whole of beings, is God, defined according to the ineffable itself, the unical alone, and superessential.
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But the bound and the infinite of beings, unfold into light that unknown and imparticipable cause; bound indeed, being the cause of stable, uniform, and connective deity; but the infinite being the cause of power proceeding to all things and capable of being multiplied, and in short, being the leader of every generative distribution.
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| is the cause of stable, uniform, and connective deity | is the cause of power proceeding to all things and capable of being multiplied |
For all union and wholeness, and communion of beings, and all the divine measures, are suspended from the first bound. But all division, prolific production, and progression into multitude, derive their subsistence from this most principal infinity.
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| all union and wholeness, and communion of beings, and all the divine measures | all division, prolific production, and progression into multitude |
Hence, when we say that each of the divine orders abides and at the same time proceeds, we must confess that it stably abides indeed, according to bound, but proceeds according to infinity, and that at one and the same time it has unity and multitude, and we must suspend the former from the principle of bound, but the latter from that of infinity.
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| each of the divine orders stably abides | each of the divine orders proceeds |
| each of the divine orders has unity | each of the divine orders has multitude |
And in short, of all the opposition in the divine genera, we must refer that which is the more excellent to bound, but that which is subordinate to infinity.
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For from these two principles all things have their progression into being, even as far as to the last of things. For eternity itself participates at once of bound and infinity; so far indeed, as it is the intelligible measure, it participates of bound; but so far as it is the cause of a never-failing power of existing, it participates of infinity.
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And intellect, so far indeed as it is uniform, and whole, and so far as it is connective of paradigmatical measures, so far it is the progeny of bound. But again, so far as it produces all things eternally, and subsists conformably to the whole of eternity, supplying all things with existence at once, and always possessing its own power undiminished, so far it is the progeny of infinity.
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so far as it is uniform, and whole, and so far as it is connective of paradigmatical measures | so far as it produces all things eternally, and subsists conformably to the whole of eternity, supplying all things with existence at once, and always possessing its own power undiminished |
And soul indeed, in consequence of measuring its own life, by restitutions and periods, and introducing a boundary to its own motions, is referred to the cause of bound; but in consequence of having no cessation of motions, but making the end of one period the beginning of the whole of a second vital circulation, it is referred to the order of infinity.
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in consequence of measuring its own life, by restitutions and periods, and introducing a boundary to its own motions | in consequence of having no cessation of motions, but making the end of one period the beginning of the whole of a second vital circulation |
The whole of this heaven also, according to the wholeness of itself, its connexion, the order of its periods, and the measures of its restitutions, is bounded. But according to its prolific powers, its various evolutions, and the never-failing revolutions of its orbs, it participates of infinity.
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according to the wholeness of itself, its connexion, the order of its periods, and the measures of its restitutions | according to its prolific powers, its various evolutions, and the never-failing revolutions of its orbs |
Moreover, the whole of generation, in consequence of all its forms being bounded, and always permanent after the same manner, and in consequence of its own circle which imitates the celestial circulation, is similar to bound. But again, in consequence of the variety of the particulars of which it consists, their unceasing mutation, and the intervention of the more and the less in the participations of forms, it is the image of infinity.
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in consequence of all its forms being bounded, and always permanent after the same manner, and in consequence of its own circle which imitates the celestial circulation | in consequence of the variety of the particulars of which it consists, their unceasing mutation, and the intervention of the more and the less in the participations of forms |
And in addition to these things, every natural production, according to its form indeed, is similar to bound, but according to its matter, resembles infinity.
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according to its form | according to its matter |
For these are suspended in the last place from the two principles posterior to The One, and as far as to these the progression of their productive power extends. Each of these also is one, but form is the measure and boundary of matter, and is in a greater degree one.
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intelligible measure | the cause of a never-failing power of existing |
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so far as it is uniform, and whole, and so far as it is connective of paradigmatical measures | so far as it produces all things eternally, and subsists conformably to the whole of eternity, supplying all things with existence at once, and always possessing its own power undiminished |
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in consequence of measuring its own life, by restitutions and periods, and introducing a boundary to its own motions | in consequence of having no cessation of motions, but making the end of one period the beginning of the whole of a second vital circulation |
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according to the wholeness of itself, its connexion, the order of its periods, and the measures of its restitutions | according to its prolific powers, its various evolutions, and the never-failing revolutions of its orbs |
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in consequence of all its forms being bounded, and always permanent after the same manner, and in consequence of its own circle which imitates the celestial circulation | in consequence of the variety of the particulars of which it consists, their unceasing mutation, and the intervention of the more and the less in the participations of forms |
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according to its form | according to its matter |
Matter however is all things in capacity, so far as it derives its subsistence from the first power. There, however, power is generative of all things. But the power of matter is imperfect, and is indigent of the hypostasis which is generative of all things according to energy.
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is all things in capacity |
| derives its subsistence from the first power | |
| the power of matter is generative of all things | |
| the power of matter is imperfect, and is indigent of the hypostasis which is generative of all things according to energy |
Very properly therefore is it said by Socrates that all beings are from bound and infinity, and that these two intelligible principles primarily derive their subsistence from God. For that which congregates both of them, and perfects them, and unfolds itself into light through all beings is The One prior to the duad. And union indeed is derived to all things through that which is first; but the division of the two orders of things is generated from these primary causes, and through these is extended to the unknown and ineffable principle. Let it therefore be manifest through these things, what the two principles of beings are, which become proximately apparent from The One, according to the theology of Plato.
The first of things mingled, is the first of beings
In the next place let us show what the third thing is which presents itself to the view from these principles. It is every where therefore called that which is mixed, as deriving its subsistence from bound and infinity. But if bound is the bound of beings, and the infinite is the infinite of beings, and beings are the things which have a subsistence from both these, as Socrates himself clearly teaches us, it is evident that the first of things mingled, is the first of beings. This, however, is nothing else than that which is highest in beings, which is being itself, and nothing else than being.
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My meaning is, that this is evident through those things by which we demonstrate that what is primarily being, is comprehensive of all things intelligibly, and of life and intellect. For we say that life is triadic vitally, and intellect intellectually; and also that these three things being life and intellect are every where. But all things pre-subsist primarily and essentially in being. For there essence, life and intellect subsist, and the summit of beings.
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Life however is the middle centre of being, which is denominated and is intelligible life. But intellect is the boundary of being, and is intelligible intellect. For in the intelligible there is intellect, and in intellect the intelligible. There however intellect subsists intelligibly, but in intellect, the intelligible subsists intellectually.
The first of beings is triple
And essence indeed is that which is stable in being, and which is woven together with the first principles, and does not depart from The One.
But life is that which proceeds from the principles, and is connascent with infinite power.
And intellect is that which converts itself to the principles, conjoins the end with the beginning, and produces one intelligible circle.
The first of beings therefore is that which is mingled from the first principles, and is triple, one thing which it contains subsisting in it essentially, another vitally, and another intellectually, but all things pre-subsisting in it essentially.
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I mean however by the first of beings essence. For essence itself is the summit of all beings, and is as it were the monad of the whole of things. In all things therefore, essence is the first. And in each thing that which is essential is the most ancient, as deriving its subsistence from the Vesta of beings. For the intelligible is especially this. Since intellect indeed is that which is gnostic, life is intelligence, and being is intelligible.
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is intelligible |
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is intelligence |
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is that which is gnostic |
If however every being is mingled, but essence is being itself, prior to all other things essence is that which subsists as mingled from the two principles proceeding from The One. Hence Socrates indicating how the mode of generation in the two principles differs from that of the mixture says, "that God has exhibited bound and infinity. " For they are unities deriving their subsistence from The One, and as it were luminous patefactions from the imparticipable and first union. But with respect to producing a mixture, and mingling through the first principles, by how much to make is subordinate to the unfolding into light, and generation to patefaction, by so much is that which is mixed allotted a progression from The One, inferior to that of the two principles.
The first of beings is intelligible essence
That which is mixed therefore, is intelligible essence, and subsists primarily from [the first] God, from whom infinity also and bound are derived. But it subsists secondarily from the principles posterior to the unical God, I mean from bound and infinity. For the fourth cause which is effective of the mixture is again God himself; since if any other cause should be admitted besides this, there will no longer be a fourth cause, but a fifth will be introduced. For the first cause was God, who unfolds into light the two principles. But after him are the two principles bound and infinity. And the mixture is the fourth thing.
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If therefore the cause of the mixture is different from the first divine cause, this cause will be the fifth and not the fourth thing, as Socrates says it is. Farther still, in addition to these things, if we say that God is especially the supplier of union to beings, and the mixture itself of the principles is a union into the hypostasis of being, God is also certainly the cause of this primarily.
Moreover, Socrates in the Republic clearly evinces that The Good is the cause of being and essence to intelligibles, in the same manner as the sun is to visible natures. Is it not therefore necessary, if that which is mixed is primarily being, to refer it to the first God, and to say that it receives its progression from him?
If also the demiurgus in the Timaeus, constitutes the essence of the soul itself by itself from an impartible and a partible essence, which is the same thing as to constitute it from bound and infinity; for the soul according to bound is similar to the impartible, but according to infinity, to the partible essence; - if therefore the demiurgus mingles the essence of the soul from these, and again separately, from same and different, and if from these being now pre-existent, he constitutes the whole soul, must we not much more say that the first God is the cause of the first essence?
That which is mixed therefore, proceeds, as we have said, from the first God, and does not subsist from the principles alone posterior to The One, but proceeds also from these, and is triadic. And in the first place indeed, it participates from God of ineffable union, and the whole of its subsistence. But from bound, it receives hyparxis, and the uniform, and a stable peculiarity. And from infinity, it receives power, and the occult power which is in itself, of all things.
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For in short, since it is one and not one, the one is inherent in it according to bound, but the non-one according to infinity. The mixture however of both these, and its wholeness, are derived from the first God. That which is mixed therefore, is a monad, because its participates of The One; and it is biformed, so far as it proceeds from the two principles; but it is a triad, so far as in every mixture, these three things are necessary according to Socrates, viz. beauty, truth, and symmetry. Concerning these things however, we shall speak again. In what manner, however, essence is that which is first mixed, we shall now explain. For this is of all things the most difficult to discover, viz. what that is which is primarily being, as the Elean guest also somewhere says; for it is most dubious how being is not less than non-being.
Essence subsists from bound and infinity
In what manner therefore essence subsists from bound and infinity must be shown. For if bound and infinity are superessential, essence may appear to have its subsistence from non-essences. How therefore can non-essences produce essence?
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Or is not this the case in all other things which subsist through the mixture of each other? For that which is produced from things mingled together, is not the same with things that are not mingled. For neither is soul the same with the genera, from which, being mingled together, the father generated it, nor is a happy life the same with the life which is according to intellect, or with the life which is according to pleasure, nor is The One in bodies the same with its elements.
Hence it is not wonderful, if that which is primarily being, though it is neither bound nor infinity, subsists from both these, and is mixed, superessential natures themselves not being assumed in the mixture of it, but secondary progressions from them coalescing into the subsistence of essence.
Thus therefore being consists of these, as participating of both, possessing indeed the uniform from bound, but the generative, and in short, occult multitude from infinity.
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For it all things occultly, and on this account, is the cause of all beings; which also the Elean guest, indicating to us, calls being the first power, as subsisting according to the participation of the first power, and participating of hyparxis from bound, and of power from infinity. Afterwards however, the Elean guest defines being to be power, as prolific and generative of all things, and as beings all things uniformly. For power and every where the cause of prolific progressions, and of all multitude; occult power indeed being the cause of occult multitude; but the power which exists in energy, and which unfolds itself into light, being the cause of all-perfect multitude. Through this cause therefore, I think, that every being, and every essence has connascent powers. For it participates of infinity, and derives its hyparxis indeed from bound, but its power from infinity.
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And being is nothing else than a monad of many powers, and a multiplied hyparxis, and on this account being is one many.
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The many however subsist occultly and without separation in the first natures; but with separation in secondary natures. For by how much being is nearer to The One, by so much the more does it conceal multitude, and is defined according to union alone.
It appears to me also that Plotinus and his followers, frequently indicating these things, produce being from form and intelligible matter, arranging form as analogous to The One, and to hyparxis, but power as analogous to matter. And if indeed they say this, they speak rightly.
But if they ascribe a certain formless and indefinite nature to an intelligible essence, they appear to me to wander from the conceptions of Plato on this subject. For the infinite is not the matter of bound, but the power of it, nor is bound the form of the infinite, but the hyparxis of it. But being consists of both these, as not only standing in The One, but receiving a multitude of unities and powers which are mingled into essence.
The Theology of Plato
Proclus
Excepts from Book III, chapters III and IV
Translated by Thomas Taylor
isbn 1 898910 07 3
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